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The French Institute for Public Health Surveillance 
monitors health events of potential international importance 
occurring worldwide to provide timely warning to French 
health authorities. We reviewed the nature and place of oc-
currence of the last 200 events. From an individual country’s 
perspective, the need for multiple sources is emphasized.
L
ocal epidemics may rapidly acquire international im-
portance due to international travel and trade (1). With 
early warning, timely and adequate control measures can 
be adopted to prevent transmission. Epidemic intelligence 
is the systematic collection and collation of veriﬁ  ed and 
unveriﬁ  ed information from various sources, such as gov-
ernments, United Nations organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), mass media, and personal commu-
nications (2). The Internet is transforming global disease 
surveillance (3). Information is selected by speciﬁ  c criteria, 
veriﬁ  ed (if informal), and thoroughly analyzed before com-
munication to the public. 
The Institut de Veille Sanitaire (InVS)—the French In-
stitute for Public Health Surveillance—set up an epidemic 
intelligence unit to monitor outbreaks worldwide along the 
lines of the World Health Organization (WHO) Depart-
ment of Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response. At 
the national level, this unit’s legal mandate is to detect, 
verify, and rapidly assess information on potential inter-
national health threats, which may affect populations in 
France or French nationals worldwide. Its main task is to 
inform French authorities, public health professionals, and 
other partners of these epidemic risks and to place events 
with excessive media coverage in the proper perspec-
tive. Information is structured and widely communicated 
weekly through the electronic Bulletin Hebdomadaire In-
ternational (BHI) (www.invs.sante.fr/international/index.
htm). To better assess the type, characteristics, and location 
of alerts documented by the unit, we reviewed the health 
events posted in the BHI, i.e., all conﬁ  rmed information on 
potential international health threats that may affect popu-
lations in France or French nationals worldwide. We also 
examined initial signals and the use of various sources of 
international epidemic intelligence. 
The Study
We reviewed 200 events posted in the 32 BHI from 
May 17, 2006 to December 27, 2006. We examined event 
topics, geographic location (country and world region), on-
set date of the ﬁ  rst case/outbreak, source, and publication 
date of the ﬁ  rst signal, delay between ﬁ  rst occurrence and 
the ﬁ  rst signal, signal type (passive email alert vs. active 
manual search) and alarm status (ﬁ  rst report vs. follow-up).
Potential sources were formal outbreak reports com-
municated by countries and supranational organizations 
(both ofﬁ  cial and NGO) posted on the Internet and scien-
tiﬁ  c online forums such as ProMED-mail (available from 
www.promedmail.org) (4–6). A dedicated tool was used 
to collect information available on the Internet: the Global 
Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) (available 
from www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/media/nr-rp/2004/2004_gphin-
rmispbk_e.html) is a software codeveloped by WHO and 
Health Canada. GPHIN is a secure, restricted-access early 
warning system that gathers media reports of public health 
signiﬁ  cance on a 24/7 basis (7). Like the medical intelli-
gence system developed by the European community, the 
GPHIN is a multilingual system that provides relevant un-
veriﬁ  ed information on public health events by monitoring 
global media sources in 7 languages. This automated pro-
cess includes a ﬁ  lter for relevancy, but speciﬁ  c email alerts 
and the categorizing of information must be complemented 
by human analysis. 
The highest proportion of events (53%, 105/199) oc-
curred in Asia (Table 1). Of these events, 61% (122/199) 
were highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza (HPAI) (H5N1) in-
fections in animals or humans. These, combined with mul-
ticountry outbreaks of cholera (8%), chikungunya virus dis-
ease (7%), dengue (7%), and poliomyelitis (6%), were the 
most recurring topics posted in the BHI (Table 2).
The ﬁ  rst signal’s source could be identiﬁ  ed in 88% 
(176/200) of events. News reports collected using the 
GPHIN were the most important initial sources of infor-
mation, providing 36% (63/176) of all initial signals (on-
line Appendix Table, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/13/10/1590-appT.htm). Of these 63 events, 
37 (59%) were automatically forwarded by the GPHIN 
e-alert system, and 26 (41%) were detected through ac-
tive searches. Ofﬁ  cial signals from the WHO network ac-
counted for 29% (51/176) of all events posted in the BHI; 
ProMED-mail provided the ﬁ   rst signal for 17% of the 
events. Of 176 events included in the BHI, 20% (35/176) 
were ﬁ  rst detected only by manual and nonspeciﬁ  c Internet 
searches. Furthermore, 60% (105/176) of the posted events 
were ﬁ  rst detected through informal sources that required 
extensive veriﬁ  cation.
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On average, delay between the ﬁ  rst case of an outbreak 
(including retrospectively) and the ﬁ  rst widely available 
signal was 3 months and 14 days (range 1 day–2 years, 10.5 
months; n = 86). Among the 200 events posted, 107 were 
reported for the ﬁ  rst time. For these, mean delay between 
the ﬁ  rst case and the ﬁ  rst signal was 1 month and 23 days 
(range 1 day–5 months, 16 days; n = 63). Based on a small 
sample of alerts, the mean delay for alert messages pro-
vided by the GPHIN was shorter (1 month, 19 days; n = 19) 
than that of the ProMED-mail (2 months, 4 days; n = 6). 
Conclusions
As in the 2006 WHO report (2), inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) 
HPAI cases and cholera outbreaks were the major topics in-
cluded in the BHI. Alerts posted for this period mainly con-
cerned Asia due to the occurrence of inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1). 
Due to the speciﬁ  c economic and political situations of each 
country, availability and sensitivity of information sources 
differed. Multiple information sources somewhat compen-
sated for these differences. Delays between the occurrence 
of events and ﬁ  rst reports reﬂ  ect the following: 1) interval 
between the occurrence of a ﬁ  rst case and development 
into a full-blown outbreak of international importance; 2) 
limitations of communicable disease surveillance, i.e., in-
terval before an event is detected; 3) intrinsic limitations of 
epidemic intelligence, i.e., availability of information; and 
4) the unavoidable prioritization of alerts, given time and 
resource constraints.
GPHIN was more efﬁ  cient than any other informa-
tion source used in this analysis, including ProMED-mail, 
both in terms of number of signals and rapidity of signal 
availability after event occurrence. Signals from GPHIN, 
however, are unveriﬁ  ed media reports,and not all relevant 
events for our speciﬁ  c needs are electronically forwarded 
as e-alert. Permanent proactive searches using GPHIN or 
similar tools remain compulsory to address this limitation. 
Time-consuming human-operated screening of each report 
of the daily GPHIN list (500–2,000 reports/day) is needed 
as signal detection cannot be automated. Veriﬁ  cation pro-
cesses are essential because reports of outbreaks are widely 
disseminated and easily accessible to the public (1).
WHO and other supranational organizations, such as 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 
monitor health events of international importance. How-
ever, these organizations cannot completely meet all needs 
of individual countries. Our experience at a national insti-
tute shows that implementation of epidemic intelligence 
should be speciﬁ  cally tailored to effectively monitor the 
health of a country’s population and translate directly into 
public health action. For example, in 2005, an extensive 
cholera outbreak was detected and documented in Sen-
egal, with far-reaching implications for Franco-Senega-
lese pilgrims. Information posted in the BHI is used by 
physicians in French tropical disease departments and 
travel clinics, who can provide timely information to trav-
elers, and  target clinical examinations of those returning 
with suggestive symptoms. The operational suspect case 
deﬁ  nition for inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) in returning travelers 
is continuously updated as foci appear in various areas. 
Information is also forwarded to the French Ministries of 
Health and Foreign Affairs to alert a larger segment of the 
population through institutional websites or warnings on 
airport billboards.  
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Table 1. Events posted in the BHI from May 17 through 
December 27, 2006, by world region*  
No. events 
Region HPAI (H5N1)  Other Total
Africa 21 29 50
Americas 0 11 11
Asia 80 25 105
Europe 20 9 29
Middle East  1 3 4
Total 122 77 199
*BHI, Bulletin Hebdomadaire International; HPAI, highly pathogenic avian 
influenza. 
Table 2. Events posted in the BHI from May 17 through 
December 27, 2006, by topic* 
Event No. (%) 
HPAI (H5N1) in animals  67 (34) 
HPAI (H5N1) in human  55 (28) 
Cholera 16 (8)
Chikungunya 13 (7)
Dengue fever   13 (7) 
Poliomyelitis 11 (6) 
Malaria 6 (3)
Japanese encephalitis  4 (2) 
Adulterated alcohol intoxication  3 (2) 
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever  3 (2) 
Plague 2 (1)
Yellow fever  2 (1) 
Deaths following influenza vaccination  1 (0.5) 
Measles 1 (0.5)
Micro-algae intoxication  1 (0.5) 
Rift Valley fever  1 (0.5) 
Viral meningitis  1 (0.5) 
Total 200 (100) 
*BHI, Bulletin Hebdomadaire International; HPAI, highly pathogenic avian 
influenza.  DISPATCHES
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